2015

Economic vs. Ideological Interests: Examining Chinese Arms Exports and Aid

James Delton Rhodes
University of Mississippi. Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College

Economic vs. Ideological Interests: Examining Chinese Arms Exports and Aid

By Delton Rhodes

Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion of the Bachelor of Arts degree in International Studies at the Croft Institute for International Studies and the Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College

University of Mississippi

Spring 2015

Approved:

_____

Advisor: Dr. Matthew DiGiuseppe

_____

Reader: Kees Gispen

_____

Reader: Gang Guo

Copyrights

Economic vs. Ideological Interests: Examining Chinese Arms Exports and Aid

Acknowledgments

I would like to first thank my three advisors, Dr. DiGiuseppe, Dr. Gispen, and Dr. Guo, for their comments and support throughout this process. I would like to thank my parents and friends for letting me rant about my thesis to them whenever I felt like it. They have been extremely helpful and supportive during this process and in all of my endeavors. Lastly, I would like to thank the Croft Institute for International Studies and the Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College for providing me with learning opportunities that I would not have imagined to be possibility when I began my academic journey at the University of Mississippi. They have truly given me one of the best undergraduate educations in the world. Thanks to you all.

Abstract

This thesis examines China's role in the world, specifically from 1990 to 2011. I discuss China's arms exports and outward direct investment (ODI) and how these relate with China's policy goals. Do Chinese leaders use these two methods as means of gaining long-term, international hegemonic/ strategic support, or are they related to gaining short-term, domestic economic-based support? In this thesis, I attempt to look into international political theory (constructivism and rationalism) and how this applies to China's current and future ambitions as a world power. I test this by looking at factors like UN voting, polity IV score, and natural resource exports of developing countries. In my results, I find that arms exports are linked to UN voting (hegemonic/ strategic goals) and that ODI is linked to the acquisition of natural resources (economic goals).

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction

Before Deng Xiaoping became the 2nd chairman of the People's Republic of China in 1978, China's GDP fluctuated greatly. In 1958, real GDP per capita grew by 18.3%. In 1961, real GDP per capita shrunk by 26.6%. During Mao Zedong's leadership from 1949 to 1976, the United States and the Soviet Union shaped China's foreign policy. Many scholars argue that Mao's foreign policy was ideologically-based and opposed Western influence. To support this view, scholars cite Mao's close adherence to Communist ideals, an early political alliance with the Soviet Union and closed trade policy towards the pro-democracy, Western nations as evidence. In contrast, other scholars claim that Mao's policy actually shows economic-oriented tendencies. They cite China's cautionary economic engagement approach after the "century of humiliation" (百年国耻) from 1839 to 1949, the Sino-Soviet Split of the early 1960s and President Richard Nixon's 1972 visit as evidence. Both camps can agree on one thing: China has made a fast transition from being a laggard to a becoming a global leader. As China's economy has continued to develop, its foreign policy has also. The 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in December 1978 marked a major change in China's economic policy. Since the "reform and opening up" policy decision was made, China has enjoyed a consistent, positive GDP growth trajectory. Throughout the 1980s, China attracted

investment. Gradually, however, it began to increase its outward global presence. Deng Xiaoping's use of the phrase "韬光养晦, 有所作为" ("hiding capabilities, biding ones time and making concrete decisions") in the early 1990s has served as a guiding principle of Chinese foreign policy throughout the 90s and 00s. The trouble with this expression is its absolute vagueness. The direct translation is clear, but the implication is unknown. This raises several questions for examining the rise of China. What exactly does this phrase suggest about China's trajectory as a new global superpower? Does Deng's vision of China focus on domestic economic rise or greater ambitions as a global hegemon? This thesis will examine the development of China's foreign policy and determine how China's influence is shaping the nature of the global trade. More specifically, I will discuss the evolution of China's arms and aid policies as they relate to China's own interests. While China has been a net exporter of arms since the 1970s, its role as an arms supplier has increased along with its role in the international system. Today, the People's Republic of China is the world's third largest weapons exporter and the fourteenth largest nation for ODI. Thus, China has become a focal point for scholars who want to define how exactly Deng's vision of China has transformed in the period since the 1990s. As a "new power" that has potentially begun a shift towards a new "revisionist orientation", China has caught the attention of the entire world (Aberg 2014).

Research Question

Is China really using arms exports to foreign nations as a proxy to advance its own political and ideological objectives? Is it simply trying to bring relative stability to areas from which it needs to extract natural resources? I want to research this question because it is not just an important issue for scholars. It is also an important question for the entire world because of China's growing role as a superpower. People want to know whether China's economic growth

will make it a stabilizing or destabilizing force in international politics. My research will focus on an important contemporary battle of international studies theory: ideological interest vs. economic interest.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

For this literature review, I will examine two competing theoretical frameworks and then consider how and/or to what extent these concepts apply to determining the end game of Chinese foreign policy. Why? Through using a debate model, this thesis can help to compare how China's current foreign policy relates to other countries and also to understand what this implies for China role in the world. This thesis will primarily concentrate on the motivations of China as a supplier of arms and aid but will also consider demand of recipient nations. Constructivists (ideological-based camp) debate that China's main foreign policy goal centers on building a new hegemonic order. Rationalists (economic-based camp) contend that China's main foreign policy centers on gaining economic benefits from other countries. Before diving into this debate, I will first discuss China's integration into the international system.

Introduction to China's integration into the international system

To understand China's current participation in neoliberal institutionalism and commercial liberalization, it is best to use an example of China's involvement in global trade organizations and integration into the international system (Momani 2013). China had a strong presence at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference. This earned it the fourth largest quota and voting share in the IMF and World Bank. After the Communist Party expelled the pro-Western Kuomintang (Republic of China) to Taiwan in 1949, Communist and Democratic nations debated whether the

PRC or the ROC should represent China in the international organizations. Throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, the People's Republic of China had a limited role in IGOs. On the surface, a lack of participation seemed like a sign of unwillingness to integrate into the international system. In reality, China partly isolated itself from foreign influence after the century of humiliation. On the other side, the West was reluctant to accept the PRC government because of its opposition towards Communism. The Cold War ideological battle both slowed down the PRC's global integration process and helped to shape the current perception that China is reluctant to play a major role in international institutions. In actuality, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the PRC used its political and economic influence to coerce other like-minded nations (namely Czechoslovakia, Finland, Poland, India and Yugoslavia) to support its goal of global integration and rejection of the Kuomintang government as the representative government of China. On October 25, 1971, the United Nations General Assembly decided to accept the PRC and reject the ROC as the official representative body of China. Although this decision marked a milestone achievement, Beijing's power in other institutions within the UN was still limited by most Western nations. The IMF and World Bank, which tended to support pro-democracy governments, recognized the ROC over the PRC. Despite efforts to keep the PRC out of these organizations, China finally began to integrate into the international community after the "open up and reform" policy of 1978 and its acceptance into IMF in 1980.

Constructivism

State ideology as a motive of foreign policy is about promoting collective interests (distinctive politic al identity, cultural influence and long-term state legacy) over individual interests (Wendt 1999). Constructivism is a theory that asserts that the main motive of a given nation's foreign policy is to spread state ideology, which enables the build-up of hegemonic

order. Constructivists say that leaders have a 'logic of consequences' and conduct a cost-benefit analysis of foreign policy decisions. They also have a 'logic of appropriateness', which is based on how other states act within the international system. Instead, the state's evaluation of "normality" or "abnormality" is a greater determinant (Wendt 1999). Institutionalism or lack thereof is not important for determining state behavior. If it is normal to export arms or send aid to a given state, more states will do so. On pages 96-97 of Alexander Wendt's *Social Theory of International Politics*, Wendt writes that the materialism vs. idealism and realism vs. liberalism debates are not suitable for determining motives of foreign policy. All states seek to some gain a comparative advantage over other nations. According to Wendt, the constructivist approach is about the "relative contribution of brute material forces to power and interest explanations" (Wendt 1999, 94). Wendt refutes the work of Waltz. While Waltz focuses on the derivative of state policy as a result of anarchic, hierarchic, and hybrid systems, Wendt argues that state choices are more closely linked with theories made by human behavioral scientists (i.e. Darwin and Lamarck). Social constructs are greater determinates of state behavior than institutional frameworks. Therefore, the constructivist approach shares a few basic principles with the rationalist approach. For example, individual power ambitions exist as an ideal of both approaches. However, power and wealth is not the end game for the constructivist system. Instead, overall state power ambitions supersede individual ambitions. In sum, leaders are not just concerned with keeping office but also want to gain popularity and propagate their vision around the globe (Wendt 1999).

Constructivist View of Chinese foreign policy

While Wendt's work does not specifically identify ways in which China's leaders support the constructivism approach, other scholars do view China's current foreign policy strategy as an

attempt to create a "new norm". Even China is concerned with the possibility of a China-US Cold War ideological framework (Howell 2014). However, China's current foreign policy rhetoric and practice are also rooted in traditional values developed during the Zhou Dynasty (1046-256 BC). Now, with the re-emergence of China, *tianxia* "all under heaven" and Confucianism have re-emerged as Constructivist-minded concepts which can be applied to modern Chinese foreign policy.

> (In China) the *tianxia* ideal pre-dated any idea of empire. Its emphasis on Heaven-blessed authority, however, led to the realization that this was ineffectual without power. The centralized bureaucratic empire was then consolidated and it used Confucian ideology to soften the harsh edges of empire, eventually creating the model of an emperor-state dressed in *tianxia* robes (Wang 2013).

The creation of a modern-day *tianxia* order would require one of two preconditions. Either Chinese leaders would have to de-emphasize territorial disputes and absolute gains of natural resources, or leaders of other nations would have to accept China as the dominant power and allow China to have control debated territories (Carlson 2010). Thus, this scenario seems unlikely to happen on a large-scale. Yet, it is an important link between Chinese history and current constructivist theory. Under a modern *tianxia* system, nations would first show support for China through policy alignment (UN voting records). In return, China would send arms and aid to these nations.

Rationalism

Rationalism, unlike constructivism, says that outside influence is unlikely to change a nation's foreign policy. Actions are not determined by the status quo definition of what is "right or good," or normatively correct behavior. James Fearon uses rationalist, theory to explain state behavior. First, international conflict happens in front of a domestic public audience; therefore, citizens are the primary influencers of leaders' decisions. Second, the decision whether or not to go to war is not directly linked to state interests or military capacity. Instead, "audience costs" is

a stronger determinate variable. Lastly, leaders are concerned with the calculated risk and reward of foreign policy. Unlike Constructivism, the opinion and behavior of other states is not an important factor for decision-making (Fearon 1994).

Rationalism is closely linked with leadership survival as the main motive of foreign policy. There are two basic premises of leadership survival theory. First, leaders want to stay in power because they feel like they will lose a certain economic and social status by relinquishing control. Second, leaders in Western democracies traditionally have a much more secure and prosperous life after finishing their political careers than leaders from other countries (Chiozza and Goemans 2011). This divide creates a sharp contrast between autocratic and democratic systems of governance. Even though Chiozza and Goemans have good theories on leadership survival and war, it is also important to examine how autocratic leaders can keep power under peaceful conditions. Other scholars explain that state policy is determined by the interests of the leader in power and that politics consists of three groups: the nominal selectorate, the real selectorate and the winning coalition (Mesquita, et al. 2002). Previous research also seeks to explain the ways that autocratic leaders become and remain powerful within a given nation. For nations using an autocratic system, the number of people that make up the winning coalition is smaller than for nations using a democratic system (Mesquita and Smith 2008). According to the rationalist camp, autocratic leaders are mostly concerned with staying in power and do not have a true "state goal". Leaders of autocratic governments have two ways of achieving this objective. 1. They can increase the availability of public goods (i.e. more wealth for citizens). Thus, the domestic economy is a more important factor for maintaining and enhancing autocratic power. 2. They can decrease the supply of coordination goods (i.e. monitor the internet and suppress protests).

Party Selection—Part Rationalism, Part *Guanxi*

Other scholars look at China's leadership change as an example of Rationalism in practice. Deng Xiaoping (1978-1989), Jiang Zemin (1989-2002) and Hu Jintao (2002-2012) were all in power for about the same amount of time. After Mao Zedong, the political focus of the politburo changed. Instead of rewarding merit and political loyalty, the system rewarded seniority. The Chinese Communist Party leadership chooses politicians who will more likely support the interests of the national economy rather than hardline party politics (Miller 2013). Thus, a structure was created to stabilize the governance system. Look at the ages of leaders in the years they became head of state, Deng (74), Jiang (63), Hu (60) and Xi (59). Also, look at the ages of the current politburo standing committee leaders at the time they assumed office in 2012. The youngest was 57 and the oldest was 67. There is also a rule which requires officials to be younger than 68 at the time of politburo selection. In contrast, the United States and many Western governments have younger officials at higher levels of government. For example, in the 2014 White House Cabinet, there are people who are only in their 40s. Why is this difference significant? In the United States, leaders can quickly emerge from no-name to household name status based on election results. In the Mao era, Chinese leaders also could be quickly promoted or demoted by Mao. In the post-Mao era, Chinese officials realized the need for greater structural constraints on leaders in the political system. Therefore, two major requirements emerged: previous economic success and connections (*guanxi*) with higher-level leaders. Up-and-coming leaders trying to advance to the politburo level use nationalism and economic growth as a means of gaining political clout; however, the battle for leadership positions has become increasingly institutionalized. At the very least, the top-level Chinese leadership is aware of the importance of

rationalism. If the politburo appoints younger or older leaders to the highest government positions, this could create unwanted succession problems. By creating this standardized system, China manages to minimize intra-party divisions at the highest level of government that are typically associated with autocratic regimes. While current leaders do have a lot of power, their ability to extend this power is naturally limited by their age.

Changing Views in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis

Case Example: Nationalism and Rationalism vs. Constructivism and *Guanxi*

The 2008 global financial crisis also marks a turning point for Chinese nationalism and changes in China's world outlook because of four main reasons. 1. Public opinion's influence on foreign policy is increasing. 2. As the government reduced funding for media outlets, these agencies had to find new methods of attracting consumers. By calling for jingoism, media outlets could make higher profits. Thus, government officials had less negotiating room on issues like the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands and South China Sea debates. 3. When both citizens and government officials began to recognize China's quick recovery from the 2008 financial crisis and the West's continued struggles, there was a sense of national confidence. 4. As consumers around the globe began to buy less and production in China slowed down slightly, some Chinese migrant workers lost their factory jobs. Because leaders could not ensure continued domestic growth, private companies could not easily maintain steady production levels. Thus, the government looked for ways to maintain economic growth (Zhao 2013 a). Thus, China began to drastically expand its financial and energy sector investments in developed nations (Meunier 2014). It also had to continue infrastructure projects, provide ODI, and employ Chinese workers abroad in the developing world (Scissors 2014).

Other scholars see China's increasing role after the 2008 financial crisis as an attempt to assert a global leadership role. New Chinese-led institutions like the New Development Bank and the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank are not only a sign of shifting economic power but also a possible sign of changing hegemonic influence (Chen 2014).

Rationalist Goals Using Constructivist Compliance

It is also worth noting that rationalist goals can also take place under a constructivist, hegemonic order. One example of this is the implementation of an arms policy that is deemed appropriate by a hegemon (constructivism) in order to meet domestic economic goals (rationalism). One current example would be the West's arms policy towards Saudi Arabia. Although the United States rhetorically supports democracy and human rights, it also sends arms and aid to dictators. While it is now an international norm to support Saudi Arabia with arms (constructivist approach), the primary motive is economic interest (rationalist approach) actually like-minded leaders in return for favorable oil policy towards the West. In turn, this provides the West with cheap oil for consumers (rationalist approach). Therefore, the constructivist approach is not necessarily based on the spread of ideology or human rights. Rather, it is based on creating norms when multiple nations working in unison towards a common policy. Thus, hegemons like the United States or China can find a balancing between realism and idealism (Bowman 2005).

Scholars also suggest that China sometimes follows the Western hegemonic order while also selectively pursuing its own rationalist interests. One example is China's shift in official policy towards humanitarian crises. Chinese leaders accepted the "responsibility to protect" (R2P) policy as a way of showing that China wants to become a "responsible power" and because the international community viewed it as "the new norm". The R2P theory, outlined by

the 2006 UN Security Council Resolution 1674, emphasizes human rights over national sovereignty. Generally, China emphasizes a foreign policy based on non-intervention. China's support in helping to end the Darfur crisis aligns more closely with the ideals of the rationalist approach because its main motive was to protect its economic interests in Sudan rather than support any sort of democratization efforts that the West often touts as its major reason for entering in foreign conflicts (Wu 2009).

Chapter 3: Theory

Autocracy and Foreign Policy

As mentioned in the literature review section, Chiozza and Goemans emphasize that there are major differences between democratic and non-democratic systems of governance. In democracies, leaders are chosen by a larger selectorate and regular removal from office occurs more frequently than irregular removal. In autocracies, leaders are chosen by a smaller selectorate and irregular removal (i.e. coups) from office occurs more frequently than regular removal (i.e. end/ beginning of term limits). Although *Leaders and International Conflict* offers a compelling comparison and contrast between leadership survival in autocracies and democracies, it does not offer a look into the different sub-categories of autocratic governments. *Dictators at War and Peace* not only expounds upon the work of scholars mentioned in the literature review but also goes in depth about specific types of non-democratic regimes. Jessica Weeks categorizes dictators into five major groups (machine, junta, boss, strongman and other). According to Weeks, China is a machine autocracy. A machine autocracy is similar to a "traditional autocracy" in the fact that there is still a single, non-democratically selected head of state; however, the machine autocratic system ensures a greater degree of political certainty

through the creation of a fixed political apparatus. Unlike in a "traditional autocracy" where the leadership transition process usually only takes place when a leader dies or is forced out of office, leaders within China's machine autocracy must meet certain age requirements to be eligible for certain levels of the government. This process creates a natural check on autocratic power. Although the origin of power within machine autocracies is much different from that of democracies, leaders in both machine autocracies and democracies share one important common goal: the maximization of political power. Nations with these two systems are far less likely to start a war than other regime types (i.e. junta, boss, strongman, etc.), and both have equally low odds of ending conflicts in defeat. Weeks argues that those civilians who have influence in machine autocracies often dissuade the top leader from making aggressive, confrontational foreign policy decisions. As evidence, in the first thirty years of its inception, the PRC was involved in many conflicts. These include the Korean War (1950 to 1951), Sino-Indian War (1962), Sino-Soviet border conflict (1969), and Sino-Vietnamese War of (1979). During those conflicts, China was actually closer to Weeks' definition of a boss autocracy. After this time, the Chinese government began a transition towards becoming its present-day machine autocracy system (Weeks 2014). In the thirty five years since then, China has not been involved in any considerable skirmishes or conflicts.

Using this historical perspective, it is becomes clearer to see recognize current Chinese leaders seek and maintain power. Although Weeks does create a more sophisticated framework for the analysis of autocracies and their usage of war as a means of political survival, a new question now arises. How do Chinese leaders obtain and maintain political power despite not being involved in any major international conflict during the timeframe of my data analysis (1990 to 2011)? *Note: that data is limited according to when nations gain independence and/ or

general availability of statistics. *Note: Data becomes more available over time; therefore, data prior to the 1990s is scarce. To look specifically at how China has operated under the machine autocracy governance system, I will identity the influencers and decision-makers. To further the work of Weeks and other scholars, I will research beyond the traditional framework of dictators and direct involvement in war. Even with a reluctance to engage in conflict, Chinese leaders still must use other means of maintaining power. Oftentimes, arms exports are viewed as a proxy for direct military engagement abroad. Similarly, foreign aid can be viewed as a method of advancing international development interests, which in turns helps China's domestic economic interests. By sending arms and aid to certain countries, top-level Chinese leaders avoid pressure from influential civilians who oppose conflict and also provide the nation's elite with what they want the most: resources and monetary wealth.

Keeping the Social Contract: China's Political and Economic Reforms

Before considering Chinese domestic politics and its effect on foreign policy during the timeframe of this research, it is essential to recognize the important changes that have taken place in the PRC since it was founded in 1949. The idea of a social contract between government and citizens is popular in Western philosophy. Now, in modern China, officials are using a rationalist approach to maintain the social contract (Nathan et al. 1999). According to rationalists, citizens and leaders both seek personal, tangible and short-term benefits. The only major difference is that these two groups work within different parameters. Leaders at all levels of government are concerned with maintaining and building their own power within political office and institutions. Citizens look to build their own power outside of the political sphere. For government officials, a sense of authority is the basic definition of power. For citizens, material wealth is the basic definition of power. First, the government ensures the availability of natural

resources. In turn, these resources provide the foundation of domestic economic growth. Because citizens perceive their lives as continually improving, they will continue to support the leaders who provide these resources.

Patterns in Leader Selection

Using the theory of leadership survival and the rationalist approach as a basis for decision-making, leaders should make foreign policy decisions (i.e. arms exports) congruent with domestic policy goals. Research shows that both economic success and patronage are both necessary for political advancement in modern China (Jia et al. 2013). Why are these findings significant for this research project? Unlike in other autocratic systems, Chinese leaders cannot rely solely on political connections for career advancement. If lower-level leaders know that economic growth under their leadership is an essential component of career advancement, they will focus on implementing pro-economic growth policies over party-based and ideological-based policies. Once these leaders are appointed to positions on the politburo where they have control over country-level policy, they will likely continue to view economic success as a factor for personal career success. Compare this with China under Mao's leadership. According to the categorizations of autocracies, Mao would be considered a personalist leader of a boss autocracy (Weeks 2014). For career advancement, political connections to the top leader are far more important than economic growth under this type of autocracy. If foreign policy goals are congruent with domestic policy, arms exports of the Mao era likely support strict adherence to ideological principles. For example, Chinese aid during the 1950s and 1960s supported African independence movements. In the 1970s, China began to become a leader of the developing world (Dreher and Fuchs 2012). The post-Mao era shift away from rigid adherence to ideology led the

national government to favor economic interests over ideological interests. As the economy began to grow and diversify, Chinese leaders saw a need to build the capacity of the private sector. With a lack of domestic natural resources, the government had to look towards foreign markets to meet consumer demand (Zhao 2013 a). After many aspects of the national economy changed from public to private control, more citizens gained economic prosperity. In turn, the nature of influence also changed. Even though decision-making power was and still is concentrated within the politburo, the notion of government officials holding accountability and meeting the needs of citizens (or at least the elite class) is becoming increasingly important. As citizens gain more wealth, they also develop more influence over the decision-makers. Who has influence in modern China? The modern Chinese class system consists of nine tiers. Realistically, only Tiers 1-3 (fewer than 6,000 people) either have direct influence of public opinion or hold decision-making power. Tier 4 (5 to 10 million) potentially has indirect influence. While this seems small for a nation of over 1.35 billion people, the percentage of people with influence has actually grown significantly since the beginning of economic reforms (Lu 2014).

Arms Exports

Bureaucratic Process of Arms Exports

The rationalist theory can be expanded to understand the rationale for arms exports. According to rationalist theory, leaders will look at domestic public opinion to determine which nations receive arms. If State A's citizens think State B is weak or not a threat to State A, leaders of State A will carry out policy X (Slantchev 2004). For example, the Chinese government, with weak polarization of domestic opinion on this issue, can sends arms to nations in Africa (regardless of regime type) even with pressure from the international community (Hanauer and

Morris 2014). Conversely, the public would have a stronger polarization of support or rejection of a similar arms deal with a nation that could possibly challenge China's short-term interests. Thus, the ultimate decision of whether or not to export certain arms is based more on short-term calculated risks involved with obtaining natural resources rather than long-term state security and leadership security (Brown and Marcum 2011).

Within the timeframe of this research, the Chinese military-industrial complex has undergone major changes. These changes often coincide with national economic restructuring. The "opening up and reform" of 1978 and the movement towards a "socialist market economy" in 1993 were policy changes made at Third Plenum conferences, which take place every five years (one year after National Congress meetings determine leadership changes). In 2008, COSTIND merged with several other agencies. It was placed under the control of the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND). SASTIND was placed under the control of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) as a new bureau under the control of the State Council. Despite the government's transition from a direct arms manufacturer towards a supervisor of private and state-owned enterprises that make weapons, the decision-making process is still ultimately controlled by the under the supervision of the Central Military Commission (CMC) (Li 2012). With the exception of Deng Xiaoping, the Chairman of the CMC has always assumed the role of Party Secretary of the PRC. Unlike in the US or other democratic nations, the top leader of a machine autocracy still has control over much of the important foreign policy decisions. In China, the power of the top leader is actually expanding. At the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress in 2013, Xi Jinping became chairman of the newly created National Security Commission. In addition to

control of foreign policy, President Xi now has greater control in domestic security policy (Tiezzi 2014).

2015 Arms Exports Decision-making Hierarchy



*Figure 3-1

Objections to Multilateral Arms Control Policymaking

In July 2012, China played an important role at the UN Resolution 61/89 negotiating conference. UN Resolution 61/89 is commonly known as the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was adopted by consensus in April 2013, but China abstained from voting. This is part of a Chinese strategy to remain neutral on issues that Chinese government deem unfavorable but does not want to express direct opposition associated by the casting of a "no" vote (Johnston 2008). This can be seen on other votes like the UN decision of action against Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War and the UN decision to declare the Crimea referendum invalid. Although this appears merely to be a way of showing silent support for autocratic legitimacy, the systems of government within Iraq and Russia were not the real reason for China's decision to abstain from voting. In these two cases, China's objection under the rationalist approach can be viewed as attempts to maintain good relations with the nations being sanctioned by the international community in an attempt to obtain more resources made available by the decrease in exports from the sanctioned nations to pre-sanction bilateral trade partners. In the case of the ATT, China's decision to abstain from voting also stems from a desire to protect its own economic interests rather than an ideological disagreement. Under the rationalist approach, its objections can be viewed as an attempt to protect the status quo of its current trade procedures and to maximize its ability to obtain natural resources through the use of arms exports rather than direct military involvement. Although China did express early objections to clauses increasing humanitarian arms control and promoting human rights (perceived to be an ideological opposition), it lightened its stance after many African countries expressed interest in these regulations. Instead, China drew two hard lines during the negotiation process. 1. It did not want Regional Integration Organizations (RIOs) to be included because of the EU's arms trade

embargo on China. 2. China did not want arms transfers as gifts to be included in the resolution. For dual-use goods, the international regulations are highly developed and established through legal resolutions. In this area, China is considered to adhere to the current rules. For conventional arms, few regulations exist. Only UN trade embargos act as international control measures. Because all of China's conventional arms exports are manufactured by SOEs, China has been reluctant to join groups like the Wassenaar Arrangement or signed agreements like the ATT because they call for the Chinese government to reveal its arms exports policy mechanisms (Bromley 2013). Even though China continues to be unfavorable towards the idea of universal human rights, this reaction can be viewed as an economic-based, rationalist and pragmatic response rather than a purely ideological objection. Therefore, an objection to human rights policy was not a major factor in China's decision not to vote.

Economic Aid

China's ODI policies also indicate a movement towards rationalism. The percentage of ODI directed towards natural resource exploration increased in the post-2000 era; however, this percentage was lower in 2005 than in 2001 (Cheung and Qian 2009). Even though this suggests a de-emphasis on the role of natural resources, it does not consider the fact that many resources could have already been discovered. Thus, the focus has changed from resource exploration to resource extraction and infrastructure development for nations where natural resources were found. In terms of economic aid, China is also more likely to send aid to countries that do not pose any threats to Chinese security and where it has it can receive a return on investment, mainly through bilateral trade. Trade volume between China and African countries went from 42.82 million USD in 2007 to as much as $250 million in 2013 as China has continued to emphasize this opportunities of this win-win situation (Zhang 2015). Chinese Ministry of

Commerce (MOFCOM) is in charge of dispersing bilateral aid. This suggests that commercial purposes drive China's investment strategy (Lammers 2007). Although the percentage of ODI sent by SOEs decreased from 100% in 2005 to 89% in 2011, this slow change towards privatization of investment flow indicates that China's central government still had almost complete control over outward cash flow (China Outward Direct Investment 2015). Prior to 2013, National Development Reform Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), and State Administration of Foreign Exchange all had regulatory power over ODI. Any ODI project over 10 million USD (natural resource-seeking 30 million USD) had to go through a time-consuming bureaucratic process. At the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress in 2013, the State Council expanded the administrative powers of provincial governments with respect to ODI. Now, any ODI project of less than 300 million USD will only be subject to the recordation filing with provincial governments. This change means that the central government no longer favors ODI from SOEs over private companies. Instead, it now encourages the expansion of the private sector (Ma et al. 2014).

There are also a few issues to consider when examining ODI. The major concern is the limited availability of a centralized aid database for all countries. MOFCOM does provide statistics regarding Chinese ODI; however, there are many problems related to tracking ODI. Looking at the top ten recipients list for Chinese ODI, there are a few issues to consider. First, only one out of the top ten recipients is actually a developing country (Sudan, ranked 10th). Developed countries can offer opportunities for bilateral trade expansion; however, these countries are not as useful for examining the role of development aid in exchange for natural resources. The largest ODI recipient is Hong Kong, a special administrative district that has belonged to China since 1997. Thus, most scholars exclude this from their analyses of Chinese

ODI. China's second and third largest recipients of Chinese ODI are the British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands, respectively. These investment locations are often used because they are untraceable and tax-free. This makes it unclear exactly where these investment end up and for what purposes. Lack of investment transparency equally or even more for the United States; therefore, it is difficult to have an entirely accurate comparison of ODI goals between machine autocratic and democratic systems.

Autocratic Enabler or Resource Seeker?

In some situations, China's hegemonic influence and economic interest overlap. Still, scholars still view the advancement of China's domestic economic interests through extraction of natural resource extraction as China's main foreign policy objective (Bromley 2013). Attempts to illegally sell weapons to Zimbabwe in 2008 and to Libya in 2011 can be viewed as defiance towards international laws. The central government defended the unsuccessful arms trade deal with Zimbabwe and denied government knowledge of a meeting between Gadhafi and arms exports representatives in Beijing. Constructivists would likely explain that these types of trade deals are part of a strategy to create a new international norm. When looking at China's bilateral relationships with autocratic governments such as these from a rationalist perspective, the reasons behind supporting autocrats becomes clearer. In early 2011, China had seventy-five companies with fifty construction contracts in Libya worth $18 billion. Chinese oil imports from Libya reached 4.5 billion in 2010, making up three percent of China's yearly total (Shinn and Eisenman 2012). Some scholars argue that China's main purpose for sending arms exports to Zimbabwe is to extract mineral deposits (Sachikonye 2012). China's overall arms strategy is not just focused on propping up like-minded dictators. Rather, it is most interested in resource

extraction. In order to do this, China tries to ensure the domestic stability of partner nations. Moreover, China also supports democratic leaders in resource-rich developing nations. For example, in 2010, Zambia announced it would further its military ties with China. These meetings have continued annually since then. The Chinese media emphasizes the importance of Zambia's support of China's core interests such as the "One China Policy", Tibet, Taiwan and human rights policy (China National People's Congress 2010). However, China's military cooperation with Zambia is not just about gaining support for ideological interests. Zambia is the world's fourth largest copper exporter and China is the world's largest copper consumer. From 2011 to 2013, Zambia attracted the most Chinese investment of any nation in all of Africa (Thondhlana 2014). These examples show that Chinese arms exports policy and aid policy does not focus on whether nations have democratic or autocratic governance systems or a good or poor human rights records. Rather, these decisions are more simply based on the establishment of cooperative bilateral relationships which can benefit China as a resource seeker.

Arms-- Causes of Regional Cooperation and Conflict

There is one exception to the natural resource extraction and arms exports theory. I expect China's relationship with neighboring countries to have a high degree of variation. There are two main theoretical reasons for this expectation. China's border disputes can be divided into two categories: land and sea (Zhao 2013 b). There are two main differences between these nations. 1. Demarcation lines of land territory between China and its neighbors have been mostly resolved since the late 1990s. In contrast, nations located in the East China Sea and the South China Sea are still in debate with China over ownership of sea territory, much of which potentially contains a high amount of petroleum. Therefore, China views its land neighbors as emerging trade partners and its sea neighbors as competitors for natural resources.

2. The ownership of shipping lanes is also a reason for competition with sea neighbors. Even if natural resources on the ocean floor are scant, the seas are an important area of transportation of natural resources. The Chinese government has taken a series of measures to avoid over-reliance on shipping across the Malacca Strait; however, eighty percent of Chinese oil imports are still shipped across this area, which is controlled by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (Zhao 2013 b). Since the focus of Chinese leaders has shifted towards of foreign natural resource value of foreign lands, regional trends should also drive the Chinese arms exports decision-making process. For example, previously, China would send arms to rogue leaders in nearby states like the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia during the 1970s. Now, however, the natural resource worth of a particular nation seems like a more realistic determinate of arms exports. Furthermore, only ten percent of Chinese arms exports are transported using Chinese ships. This is vulnerability for China's energy security. Thus, China would not theoretically send arms to nations with which it has the potential for future competition or conflict.

Chapter 4: Hypothesis

The debate between Constructivists and Rationalists is important to modern-day study of the international system and its actors. Various scholars try to build theoretical foundations to explain the decision-making process and results. After carefully examining the scholarly literature, I have derived the following hypothesis: there should be a positive correlation between Chinese arms exports/ aid and resource imports. I expect the quantitative analysis in both cases

to closely reflect the rationalist theory. Despite the fact that China appears to have developed a highly structured framework to limit the power of government officials and create smooth power transitions, leaders at all levels of government are still need domestic support as the basis for maintaining control and advancing within the party. As a result, individual leaders will look towards quantitative sources (i.e. national GDP, wage increases) and qualitative sources (i.e. standard of living, nationalism) of legitimacy. This means that leaders must support various types of governments that are already in place throughout the world. Even though actors like the United States and other established powers do challenge China to assert itself as a revisionist-minded state, I predict that China's response to challenges on issues like human rights and good governance, China will not simply rely upon support from like-minded leaders. As the aforementioned scholars have mentioned, China has adopted the Right to Protect, known as R2P, theory and subsequent UN resolution, but it has actually only applied the support of R2P in places where resource-extraction is already high and where further destabilization would lead to a reduction in economic cooperation. By diversifying arms exports and aid to nations with various regime types and human rights records, China has valued the short-term, more tangible gains over the long-term, less tangible gains.

Arms— Non-Regional Cooperation/ Non-Cooperation

Within the 1995 to 2012 era, I expect China's arms to be diversified and based on the presence or lack thereof of natural resources that are vital towards economic growth. Due to China's lack of domestic natural resources, it must look towards other nations that have abundant resources. Therefore, I expect a non-regional nation with oil, minerals and other vital possessions

will generally receive more arms from China than a non-regional nation that does not possess resources.

Arms— Regional Cooperation and Conflict

According to the rationalist approach, China will not necessarily support regimes within the Asia-Pacific region which have similar political and ideological beliefs. Instead, Chinese arms exports should show a decrease over time to both autocratic and democratic leaders of regional, resource-competing neighbors as the need for economic growth began to play a greater role in political advancement within China. If China views resources as attainable under its own direct control, it will not try to cooperate with states which also try to hold claims to these resources. China has no room to dispute over resources that lie within another county's economic and political domain. Instead, leaders can only legitimately argue for control over areas which have yet to have any official international recognition of belonging to a particular nation. Thus, Chinese leaders realistically view oceanic neighbors in the East China Sea and the South China Sea as either direct threats to control over or mutual use of oil resources, which would hinder China's economic interests.

Chinese Aid

Because ODI data is limited mostly to African countries, I exclude the Asia-Pacific intra-regional hypothesis from my analysis of Chinese aid policy. Although China has ODI in almost every African country, I expect that this is due to the overall demand for development across the entire continent. I predict that China does not view its economic aid policy in non-regional states as a way to promote the formation of hegemonic power. Instead, I expect that Chinese ODI favors resource-rich countries over resource-poor countries. Therefore, this hypothesis aligns

with the rationalist approach that Chinese aid policy reflects the interests of the domestic audience. In sum, China's aid policy reflects its need for natural resources from recipient nations, which indicates an emphasis of economic benefits over ideological/ strategic interests.

Chinese Arms Exports Hypotheses

Geographic Domain, Economy Characteristic	Status of Bilateral Relationship	Significant Arms Trade?
Regional (Sea), EEZ overlap with China	Competitive	No
Regional (Land), Resource-Rich	Cooperative	Yes
Regional (Land), Resource-Poor	Neutral	No
Non-Regional, Resource-Rich	Cooperative	Yes
Non-Regional, Resource-Poor	Neutral	No

*Figure 4-1

Chinese Outward Direct Investment Hypotheses

Geographic Domain, Economy Characteristic	Status of Bilateral Relationship	High level of ODI?
Non-Regional, Resource-Rich	Very Cooperative	Yes
Non-Regional, Resource-Poor	Somewhat Cooperative	No

*Figure 4-2

Chapter 5: Research Design

Testing the Hypothesis

To test the hypothesis, I employ a time-series cross-sectional analysis of Chinese arms exports and aid to developing nations from 1990 to 2011. I use a variety of variables related to arms exports, political, economic and military structures to run quantitative analyses.

Scope

For this research, I will look specifically at Chinese arms exports and aid to developing nations. To categorize and separate developed nations from developing nations, I filter out nations which are members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This organization began in 1961 with twenty member states. Since then, it has expanded to include thirty-four countries. Almost all of these nations are considered to be developed nations. For this thesis, I examine the role Chinese foreign policy plays in the developing world. For nations which were not initially member states but later became member states, I include data up until the year before they joined the OECD. I exclude the OECD member countries because they are more likely to be arms exporters themselves and less reliant upon foreign aid for economic growth. Thus, their respective foreign policy strategies are less likely to be directly influenced by Chinese arms exports and aid policies.

Dependent Variables

Chinese arms exports from 1991 to 2011 serves as the first dependent variable in this analysis. Because this is an absolute value, I log the Chinese arms exports variable. I have

chosen arms exports as a dependent variable because this represents a theoretical means of achieving foreign policy goals. Although it would be ideal to look at changes in Chinese arms exports policy starting from an earlier period of time, some important World Bank Development Indicators are only available from 1990 onward. For data, I use the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's (SIPRI) arms transfers importer/ exporter trend-indicator (TIV) values. Instead of using the actual price point of weapons, SIPRI TIV is based on the actual numbers and types of weapons sold. For example, if China sells the same number of comparable arms at a lower price point than the United States does, TIV list both as equal values. Thus, inconsistencies in elasticity of demand and nominal currency changes are removed from the equation. This makes SIPRI TIV a reliable and consistent dataset for using arms exports as a dependent variable.

Next, Chinese ODI from 2000 to 20011 serves as the second dependent variable of this analysis. Because this is an absolute value, I log the Chinese ODI variable. Although China did send economic aid prior to 2000, data is unavailable before this time period from a centralized source. In previous research regarding aid, scholars have had to compile data from various databases. To simplify this process, I use AidData's Chinese investment dataset. Because this dataset includes mostly sub-Saharan nations, I will not be able to test the cooperation-competition theory regarding aid's usage in the Asia-Pacific region. However, I can still test whether aid is dispersed according to China's potential for natural resource extraction in a given country. For both arms and aid, I choose 2011 as the end year for the data analysis because this is the latest year in which all natural resource independent variables are available.

According to the rationalist approach, arms exports and aid statistics should suggest that China is mostly concerned with short-term, economic interests (i.e. acquisition of natural

resources). According to the constructivist approach, arms exports and aid statistics should suggest that China is mostly concerned with long-term, ideological interests (i.e. supporting like-minded leaders of foreign countries, and/or countries that express support Chinese foreign policy). Alternatively, arms export and aid could also represent demand from certain countries. In this instance, both the constructivist and rationalist approaches would indicate a null hypothesis where the broader economic and ideological interests of China are not as essential to the arms exports policymaking process as the military armament needs of recipient nations.

I also use arms exports and aid as dependent variables to compare the potential differences between these two methods of foreign policy engagement. Arms exports are considered to be the more controversial and regulated in comparison to ODI. Therefore, China as a supplier and recipient nations as consumers likely have different views on what is expected prior to or after making these two different types of transfers. A given nation is more likely to be more receptive towards offers of ODI than offers of arms. Likewise, China is more likely to be more concerned with potential backlashes in arms exports and less concerned with a potential misuse of ODI. Both dependent variables can help to determine whether China's emerging image as a global superpower is driven by its own domestic economic needs or a desire for hegemonic influence. While Western powers show an inconsistency between rhetorical support of human rights and a continuation of arms policies that actually favors oppression under autocratic rule, little is still known about whether China's foreign policy rhetoric and record align together.

Testing the Rationalist Approach

First, I examine whether arms and aid correlate with natural resources. I use is the oil and gas value (in 2009$) as the main variable independent variable. To avoid skewed data, I log this

value. Some limitations on direct representation of the theoretical model do exist. While it would be ideal to use a statistic like oil and gas exports (by volume), much of this data is missing from both the World Bank and Michael L. Ross datasets. While the oil and gas value (in 2009$) does not factor for the possibility of varying degrees of domestic consumption in the country of production, it is useful to understand oil production as an absolute number. This is a good indicator of a given nation's potential for the use of natural resources as a major export commodity. One potential flaw to oil exports data is that a nation which has oil resources does not necessarily send most of its oil to China. Also, China might be an arms exports free-rider, meaning that China could import oil from a given nation which relies upon arms exports from countries like the United States and Russia instead of China. The unavailability of consist data to track bilateral oil transactions makes it difficult to get a true correlation between the theoretical and empirical models.

In regressions 1-5, I use oil and gas value (in 2009$) as an independent variable. In regression 1 and 5, I include oil rents (% of GDP) and coal rents (% of GDP) as variables to examine the hypothesis of natural resource-based arms policy across different natural resource variables. In regression 5, I include mineral rents (% of GDP).

While these three additional variables do not indicate a given state's overall natural resource production level, they can be used to determine whether or not China sends arms and aid to countries with more diversified economies or to those that are more reliant upon natural resource exports as a percentage of the economy. All four variables are all useful for testing the rationalist theory as it applies to China's arms exports policy. If there is a correlation, the hypothesis that states the domestic audience's need for economic growth will be supported by

the data. If there is no correlation, then the evidence is not significant enough to support the rationalist theory.

Testing the Constructivist Approach

Afterwards, I include a variable with the United Nations General Assembly voting data (Strezhnev and Voeten 2013). This variable indicates how nations UN General Assembly voting record compares to China's voting record. Values of these variables range from 0 to 1. Statistics closer to 0 indicate dissimilarity, and statistics closer to 1 indicate a similarity. This variable tells to what extent China uses arms for UN votes as a strategic option for gaining international support. I use this variable to test the strategic interest of arms exports and aid. Although this variable does not determine whether recipients share a similar political system with China, it does help to understand whether China sends arms to nations who express similar international policymaking. Thus, this variable can be used as a way of testing whether recipient nations possibly align with China's hegemonic vision. It is useful because it serves as a political-economic hybrid variable. While it does not directly represent ideological or economic similarity, it can be used as a measurement of how arms and aid are used to achieve certain goals of Chinese foreign policy. However, the variable is limited by the fact that arms exports and aid are not necessarily sent as a part of a re-creation of the *tianxia* concept mentioned in the literature review. Instead, UN voting similarity to China could simply be an after-effect of support for China after arms and aid have already been sent to a given nation. Still, UN voting infinity data serves as a good variable to test whether China receives any strategic benefit from exporting arms and sending aid. In regression 3, I use one regression that includes UN voting as an independent variable and one regression that does not include UN voting to see whether inclusion/ exclusion of UN voting has an effect on arms exports.

Then, I use data from the Center for Systemic Peace to add control variables related to ideology. I use the Polity IV to determine a given nation's governance system. This variable tests the constructivist approach that says China is likely to send arms to like-minded leaders with similar systems of government. This variable tests the hypothesis that a nation with an autocratic political ideology similar to China was once considered to be a more likely recipient and that ideology becomes less important over time as the focus of China's foreign policy has changed towards emphasizing meritocracy over ideology. I include this variable to see whether any certain system of governance is an archetypical recipient of Chinese arms. This variable is useful because it provides a wide scale for determining a given nation's government type. The Polity IV score value ranges from -10 to +10. -10 indicates a high-level autocracy and +10 indicates a high level of democracy. There are also three values (-66, -77, -88) that indicate a period of instability for a given nation. Because these cases do not provide a clear estimate for a given nation's governance system, I label them as "system missing" to avoid incorrectly skewing the data.

Before and After the "Go Out" Policy

Next, I examine whether China's arms policy has changed over time. To do this, I create a dummy variable. Arms exports sent before 2000 are labeled with a value of 0. Arms exports sent after 2000 are labeled with a value of 1. I choose the year 2000 as a control variable for two main reasons. Although both the "opening up and reform" policy of 1978 and the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989 are both examples of turning points away from an emphasis on party principles and towards economic-based policy, some important data is unavailable until 1990. Still, 2000 is an important year for examining China's arms and aid policies because it marked a shift away from an emphasis on FDI and towards ODI with the passage of the "Go Out" Policy

(Nash 2012). I expect that this shift not only pertained to investment policy but also towards a natural resources-oriented arms export policy. I use the time variable as a way to test the theory that China has transitioned from a constructivist-based foreign policy towards a rationalist-based foreign policy. In regressions 1, 2, and 3 the "Before or After 2000" variable is simply used to see if China's arms exports increase or decrease over time. This variable is useful because it takes into account the reality that the quality of China's arms exports are continuously improving, making them more desirable for potential recipient nations. To examine changes over time, I compare the pre-2000 and 2000-2011 comparison in regression 4.

Regional Trends

Next, I look at the hypothesis which says that China likely sends many arms to land border nations because of the presence of pre-established borders and a need for economic cooperation. Also, I test the hypothesis which says that China likely sends few arms to sea border nations because of the lack of established borders and a desire for full control of oceanic territory as well as the natural resources found at the bottom of the ocean floor. To test these theories, I create dummy variables to analyze China's arms exports within the Asia-Pacific region. For the first variable, I give any nation that does not share a land border with China a value of 0. Any nation that does share a land border with China receives a value of 1. For the second variable, I look at nations which have a sea border with China. To determine this, I look at claims for exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the East China Sea and South China Sea to determine which nations have EEZ overlaps with China (Sea Around Us Project 2015). I give any nation that does not share a sea border with China a value of 0. Any nation that does share a sea border with China receives a value of 1. In regressions 1, 3, and 4, I use this variable as a comparison

between border and non-border states. This means that all nations are included in these regressions. In regression 2, I exclude every non-border state from the analysis. Then, I list regional states into two categories: land and sea neighbors. *Note that Vietnam is listed in both categories. This provides a more direct comparison between land and sea border neighbors to see if any variation exists in China's arms exports policy.

Accounting for Demand

The Center for Systemic Peace also provides a dataset called "Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2013". From this dataset, I use two main variables: total civil conflict and total international conflict. *Note: For each case country, these two values indicate the status of bordering countries involvement with civil and international conflict, and do not include information about civil conflict within a case country. Nevertheless, nations which have higher levels of civil and/ or international conflict surrounding them are generally expected to have a higher overall demand for arms than other nations which do not; therefore, these variables will take demand for arms into account. They are important not only because they provide information to form a potential archetypical recipient of Chinese arms and aid but also because they can suggest if the relationship between conflict and Chinese foreign policy has changed focus over time.

The size of a given nation's military capacity is another important variable that accounts for demand I use data from the World Bank Development Indicators to factor for military personnel and military expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Even nations which do not face an immediate threat of civil or international conflict oftentimes still buy arms as a deterrent of possible future conflict. Again, these variables are similar to the international and civil conflict

variables by the fact that they are useful in controlling for expected changes in demand. The military expenditures variable is important because it is used to control for instances where nations have larger militaries. To account for the size of national economies, I use GDP per capita (constant 2005 $). Since this is an absolute value, I log the GDP per capita variable. To account for changes in reliance on international trade, I include trade (% of GDP), which is a part of the World Development Indicators dataset. This statistic can help determine if nations which have an overall higher dependence on trade are also dependent on Chinese arms and aid. Also, I will use population information provided by Michael L. Ross' database. I also log the population variable. This serves as an important control variable because developing nations with larger populations are expected to have a greater demand for arms and aid.

Chapter 6: Results

Arms Exports

Natural Resources (All Nations in Sample) (Table 1)

There is no evidence to support my original hypothesis that a positive correlation exists between Chinese arms exports and natural resource imports. For natural resources in regression #1, two independent variables (coal rents and oil rents) have a negative, significant correlation with arms exports. One independent variable (log of oil and gas value in 2009$) has a negative, insignificant correlation with arms exports. Because China has the world's largest economy and

the largest population, it is reasonable to assert that it relies heavily upon natural resources. Why do the results for arms exports not support the rationalist approach?

China's overall usage and level of foreign reliance upon a given resource are two major factors that determine the government's foreign policy towards natural resources. First, it is best to consider the degree of diversity (or lack thereof) of natural resources needed to fuel economic growth in China. In 2011, this categorical breakdown includes 69% coal, 18% oil, 6% hydroelectric power, 4% natural gas, < 1% nuclear, and 1% other renewables (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2014). Until 2007, China's domestic coal production met consumer demand; therefore, coal was not necessarily a natural resource that China had to search for beyond its borders prior to this time. After this point, coal imports became not just a convenient addition to the domestic supply to but a fundamental necessity to the short-term sustainability of domestic economic growth. Even after this time, however, China still produced a large quantity of coal. In 2012, China produced 47% of the world's total coal output and used it as a source for 81% of energy production (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2014). China's emergence as a coal importer only began in the last four or five years of this data analysis; therefore, the possibility of observing a reversal of the negative correlation between arms exports and coal imports is unlikely.

Next, China has been a net oil importer since 1993. Seemingly, there should a link between arms exports and oil imports; however, there are quite a few reasons to explain why the correlation between arms exports and oil resources does not support the rationalist approach. Looking at China's oil imports by source for 2011, Saudi Arabia, Angola, and Iran are the top suppliers (US Global Investors 2015). Ironically, the potential usage of arms instead of aid as a means of obtaining resources is based on the idea that developing countries are more concerned

with military strength than economic growth. Thus, this would require a paradox between rationalist theory applied to China as a supplier and non-rationalist theory applied to recipient nations as consumers. While developing nations often demand a large quantity of arms, these governments do not always gain and maintain power based on military strength alone. Angola is one example of this. While Angola did not receive any arms from China during the duration of this analysis, Angola's overall reliance upon arms imports is low, especially when compared to other developing countries. For Angola and other developing nations, short-term economic growth (rationalist approach) could be the best indicator of a leader's ability to maintain power. If the domestic economic situation is relatively good, the possibility of civil unrest is lower. As a result, the government does not have to rely upon its military strength to maintain power.

Still, for some nations from which China imports oil, there is a heavy reliance on arms imports. In this situation, China has empirically not been the top choice as a weapons supplier. In some instances, China is an arms exports free rider. For example in 2011, Saudi Arabia was China's largest source of oil imports. China did not provide any weapons to Saudi Arabia. Instead, the United States provided Saudi Arabia with $1.6 billion in arms (SIPRI 2015). Even in a nation like Iran where China plays a significant role as an arms provider, Russian arms imports still far surpass Chinese arms imports.

The non-correlation between arms exports and oil imports can be explained by oil providers' overall non-reliance on arms (i.e. Angola) and oil providers' reliance on other powers for arms (Saudi Arabia and Iran). The trade relationship between China and oil providers is not usually simply based on direct monetary transactions. While China does not necessarily use arms as a source of hard power, it often uses development loans as a substitute method.

> By the end of 2012, Chinese NOCs had secured bilateral oil-for-loan deals with several countries, amounting to around $108 billion according to FGE. China provided loans to countries that need capital to extract energy reserves and build energy infrastructure in exchange for oil and gas imports at established prices. China extended oil-for-loan deals with Russia, Kazakhstan, Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Angola, and Ghana and has had a gas-for-loan agreement with Turkmenistan over the past decade (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2014).

This information indicates that China uses ODI as its primary method of obtaining natural resources. For example, loan deals, grants, infrastructure construction projects, and other ODI all act as supplements to direct monetary transactions of natural resource transactions. This helps to explain why there is a non-correlation between arms exports and natural resource imports.

Asia-Pacific Regional Comparison (Table 2)

As stated in the theory section, I expected that there should be a change in arms exports policy to occur between China and its neighbors, depending on their geographic location relative to China. Does China's arms exports policy reflect this geographic dynamic? In Table 1, all three natural resource models show a negative correlation between sea neighbors and arms exports. In contrast, zero natural resource models show any correlation between land neighbors and arms exports. Table 1 includes all nations; therefore, nations sharing a sea border with China receive significantly fewer arms than nations that do not. Land neighbors show no major differences in arms received when compared to the rest of the world. When directly comparing nations with land and sea border countries in Table 4, there is no significant correlation between location and arms exports; however, all other tables do indicate a difference between sea and land neighbors.

Table 2 is a direct comparison between land and sea border states. All non-border states are excluded. In Model 2, there is a positive, significant correlation between resource-rich land neighbors and arms exports. However, there is no correlation between sea neighbors with resources and arms exports. Still, the theory that location matters as a determinate of arms policy is supported by the results. Sea neighbors receive fewer arms compared to both land neighbors and non-border states. In contrast, land neighbors receive many more arms than sea neighbors and also more than non-border states. Data regarding intra-regional arms exports policy supports the competition-cooperation theory and the rationalist approach.

With and Without UN Voting (Table 3)

In the data design section, I mentioned that the constructivist approach could potentially be supported by a positive correlation between arms exports policy and UN voting record. Does China's arms exports policy favor nations who support China's overall world vision? In Table 1, there is a positive, significant correlation between arms exports and UN voting across all models. In contrast, there are significant, negative correlations between arms exports and two natural resource models. In Table 3, I look at whether the inclusion or exclusion of United Nations General Assembly voting has any effect on the correlation between arms exports and natural resources. With the exclusion of the UN voting variable, the Polity IV score goes from being positively significant (trending towards democratic governments as recipients of Chinese arms) to insignificant. The log of population goes from being insignificant to positively significant; however, there is no change in the log of oil and gas value. This means that the overall impact caused by the inclusion or exclusion of the UN infinity voting variable has a minimal change on the arms exports analysis. As mentioned earlier in the discussion of Table 4, UN voting's

importance decreased in the 2000-2011 era; however, it is still a significant, positive factor for China's arms exports policy.

While there is a possibility that China sends arms to countries before gaining support in UN voting and that UN voting could represent a hybrid of economic and political interests for both China and arms recipients, evidence shows that China does send arms to nations that have similar world views. In sum, results of these arms exports regressions indicate that China uses a constructivist approach when choosing where to send arms. There is no support for the rationalist approach that arms policy has changed according to China's own short-term economic interests as an arms supplier.

Before and After the "Go Out" Policy (Table 4)

As stated in the data design section, I use the 1990-1999 and 2000-2011 eras for comparison because of the implementation of the "Go Out" Policy which began in 2000. In the theory section, I stated that there should be a change in arms export policy to occur over time as China's economy continued to grow. 2000 marks a clear turning point for both China's official foreign policy outlook. Has the Chinese government's decision to change from a predominantly FDI-focused economy to an ODI-focused economy affected the way it exports arms? In the 2000-2011 era, log of population, log of GDP per capita, and total civil conflict go from insignificant to positively significant values. Only the total civil conflict of bordering states has moved from insignificant to positively significant. Only the Polity IV score changed from positively significant to insignificant. This indicates that, from 2000 to 2011, a nation's political system had no impact on whether China's arms exports policy. While the standardized coefficient of the UN variable does drop, it still has a positive correlation with Chinese arms exports. This indicates that China is not as focused on sending arms to nations in return for UN

votes; however, it still does send a significant number of arms to nations with similar UN voting records Also, the change towards correlation between arms and civil conflict indicates a general change in warfare. Most nations are no longer focused on a direct threat of a militaristic neighboring country. Conversely, leaders are concerned that civil conflicts in other nations will spill over into their borders, and/or a similar civil uprising will take place within their own nations.

Outward Direct Investment

Natural Resources and Chinese ODI (Table 5)

Since ODI is an essential part of Chinese foreign policy, it is important to test whether aid China gives ODI solely based on a given nation's need for development or based on China's need for natural resources. In Table 5, I use the log of Chinese aid as the dependent variable. To find out whether Chinese ODI correlates with natural resources, I use the same three natural resource variables as I use in Table 1 (log of oil and gas value, oil rents, and coal rents). I also include mineral rents (% of GDP). I do this because not only is it important to be aware of China's largest overall needs (oil and coal) but also what the nations in AidData's dataset have to offer as exports. While the sub-Saharan region does have a few oil-rich nations, more nations have a larger supply of minerals. Minerals counted in this dataset include tin, gold, lead, zinc, iron, copper, nickel, silver, bauxite, and phosphate. In 2010, minerals made up nearly 80% of China's imports from Africa (The Economist). http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21574012-chinese-trade-africa-keeps-growing-fears-neocolonialism-are-overdone-more Therefore, the inclusion of this variable is necessary.

For the log of oil and gas value (2009 $) and coal rents (% of GDP), natural resources do not have a significant correlation with Chinese aid. These two variables support neither rationalist nor constructivist approaches. For oil rents (% of GDP) and for mineral rents (% of GDP), natural resources have a positive and significant correlation with Chinese aid. These two variables support the rationalist approach that China uses economic aid to obtain certain natural resources. Another important observation of ODI regressions when compared to arms exports regressions is the change in correlation with the UN General Assembly voting variable. As stated earlier, the UN voting variable has a positive and significant correlation with arms exports regressions, suggesting a constructivist and/ or strategic approach. This suggests that China's international support comes either as a pre-requisite or a result of its arms exports policy. For aid, however, China is does not favor nations who vote similarly in the UN. For oil rents (% of GDP) and for mineral rents (% of GDP), there is a negative, insignificant correlation between aid and UN General Assembly voting. For the log of oil and gas value (2009 $) and coal rents (% of GDP) variables, there is a negative, significant correlation between aid and UN voting. These results do not support the constructivist theory. This indicates that nations do not view aid from China as a sign of similar world views. The constructivist approach is likely not supported because of the fact that the United States and many Western countries who align with the hegemonic interests of the United States also send aid to Africa. Thus, a country that receives ODI from China will not necessarily align with China's world view. This means that there is likely a perception difference between arms aid both from China as a supplier and also from foreign nations as recipients.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

While there are limitations of data availability on natural resources, arms exports, and outward direct investment, I think that this research project gives insight into the motives of Chinese foreign policy. If I had more time and resources available, I would examine more specific case studies of countries to which China sends arms and aid. Also, I would do have included the United States and Russia in a comparative analysis to see whether China employs a new method as a supplier of aid and arms or simply uses a similar model to these two nations. What does this research project mean for examining the recent history and future trajectory of China's foreign policy objectives? First, China's aid and arms exports continue to increase. There is a major difference between the use of arms and aid. While China uses arms to build a hegemonic order (constructivism), it uses aid to help grow its domestic economy (rationalism). China also uses a nation's geographic location to determine how it conducts foreign policy. While land border states and non-border states are more likely to be recipients of Chinese arms and aid, sea border states are less likely to receive these benefits. I originally predicted that arms exports and aid both closely correlate with China's quest for natural resources. As shown in the results section, the sharp contrast between these two methods helps to explain how China simultaneously seeks domestic approval through its ODI and gains international support by sending arms to nations which have similar UN General Assembly voting records. China often emphasizes a non-alignment, non-interference foreign policy philosophy. This rhetoric applies mostly to China's goal to avoid direct military intervention. On the other hand, China still use arms exports as a means of indirectly affecting the future of recipient nations. Regardless of whether arms exports are sent to states that align with China prior to or after receiving arms,

China generally does expect that arms exports should be accompanied by support for Chinese foreign policy goals. From a broader perspective, China's current investments strategy in Africa could be a positive model for how it extracts natural resources. Although China might contribute to an increasing amount of global environmental problems, natural resources like oil are an immediate necessity for China. By using infrastructure projects instead of arms exports as a new means of obtaining resources, partner nations could experience a more positive future. By providing infrastructure, China can help to boost global economic development in countries that traditionally suffered from a lack of basic investment. While results could indicate that China is potentially favoring non-diversified economies, China's investment efforts also could signify more potential opportunities for workers in these countries while also meeting consumer demands for continued domestic economic growth in China.

The emergence of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is a good example of how China is re-shaping the way the world looks at ODI. America's traditional European allies (UK, France, and Germany) have all entered AIIB to the reluctance of the United States government. European nations likely view aid from a rationalist approach, especially in light of the Eurozone's continued economic recession. While these nations still align with US hegemony, they see China as the leader of the current global economy and that teaming up with China on ODI projects could benefit their respective domestic economies. China, however, likely views AIIB as a way to combine China's interests in short-term, domestic economic growth with its goal to increase its long-term hegemonic power in the Asia-Pacific region. While the results of this research paper do not show aid as a method of gaining hegemonic power, AIIB and similar organizations like the Africa Growing Together Fund and the New Development Bank could

lead to a more positive correlation between not only aid and natural resources but also between aid and UN voting.

Natural Resources (All Nations in Sample)

	Log of Oil and Gas Value (2009 US$)		Oil Rents (as a % of GDP)		Coal Rents (as a % of GDP)	
	B	Standard Error	B	Standard Error	B	Standard Error
Before or After 2000	*0.111517	0.04764	*0.200351	0.05803	*0.173916	0.05627
UN voting record compared to China, "similar or dissimilar"	*0.621127	0.11794	*0.600880	0.12934	*0.560540	0.12693
Land Border with China?	0.02346	0.08333	-0.02936	0.09613	-0.02105	0.09642
Sea Border with China?	*-0.560023	0.13426	*-0.505618	0.14499	*-0.503227	0.14336
Polity IV Score	*0.011195	0.00437	0.00269	0.00557	*0.010499	0.00488
Total International Conflict of Bordering States	*0.065226	0.00710	*0.084125	0.00855	*0.080232	0.00840
Total Civil Conflict of Bordering States	*0.139747	0.02120	*0.150508	0.02507	*0.149727	0.02475
Military expenditure (% of GDP)	-0.00299	0.00973	-0.00947	0.01110	-0.00983	0.01065
Log of Armed Forces Personnel	*0.136590	0.03325	*0.218062	0.04213	*0.220145	0.04032
Log of GDP Per Capita	*0.106205	0.03244	*0.091082	0.04010	0.06799	0.03737
Trade (% of GDP)	-0.00040	0.00057	*-0.001317	0.00066	-0.00122	0.00066
Log of Population	0.05484	0.03720	-0.01096	0.04625	-0.00035	0.04353
Natural Resource Variable	-0.00571	0.01925	*-0.006128	0.00256	*-0.063988	0.02890
Constant	*-3.712972	0.51506	*-3.345026	0.64424	*-3.345187	0.60004
R Square	0.211		0.236		.238	
Observations	1843		1484		1515	

Table 1

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Asia-Pacific Regional Comparison

	Land Neighbors		Sea Neighbors	
	B	Standard Error	B	Standard Error
Before or After 2000	*0.457005	0.17967	0.04253	0.12689
UN voting record compared to China, "similar or dissimilar"	-0.74731	0.78444	0.93137	1.44635
Sea/ Land Border with China?	*0.967215	0.39460	*1.788011	0.77208
Polity IV Score	0.02122	0.01147	*0.130351	0.05485
Total International Conflict of Bordering States	*0.246482	0.02226	-0.01246	0.02316
Total Civil Conflict of Bordering States	*1.083454	0.08588		
Military expenditure (% of GDP)	*0.166883	0.05288	0.00935	0.04903
Log of Armed Forces Personnel	*0.508868	0.12240	0.17144	0.21672
Log of GDP Per Capita	*0.311238	0.14723	0.19587	0.20921
Trade (% of GDP)	*-0.009318	0.00328	-0.00070	0.00205
Log of Population	*-0.801039	0.13254	-0.37918	0.30448
Log of Oil and Gas Value (2009 US$)	*0.370491	0.08549	0.12732	0.13398
Constant	3.92811	2.35919	0.88868	7.46001
R Square	0.802		.212	
Observations	171		62	

Table 2

Model 1 Model 2

With and Without UN Voting

	Model 1		Model 2	
	With UN Voting		Without UN Voting	
	B	Standard Error	B	Standard Error
Before or After 2000	*0.111517	0.04764	*0.134576	0.04702
UN voting record compared to China, "similar or dissimilar"	*0.621127	0.11794		
Land Border with China?	0.02346	0.08333	-0.06931	0.07924
Sea Border with China?	*-0.560023	0.13426	*-0.449464	0.13232
Polity IV Score	*0.011195	0.00437	0.00128	0.00400
Total International Conflict of Bordering States	*0.065226	0.00710	*0.067544	0.00699
Total Civil Conflict of Bordering States	*0.139747	0.02120	*0.138614	0.02111
Military expenditure (% of GDP)	-0.002994	0.00973	-0.00996	0.00967
Log of Armed Forces Personnel	*0.136590	0.03325	*0.111964	0.03280
Log of GDP Per Capita	*0.106205	0.03244	*0.077771	0.03193
Trade (% of GDP)	-0.00040	0.00057	-0.00021	0.00056
Log of Population	0.05484	0.03720	*0.073734	0.03611
Log of Oil and Gas Value (2009 US$)	-0.00571	0.01925	-0.01010	0.01882
Constant	*-3.712972	0.51506	*-2.954009	0.50001
R Square	0.211		0.189	
Observations	1843		1890	

Table 3

	Model 1	Model 2

Before and After the "Go Out" Policy

	Before 2000		2000-2011	
	B	Standard Error	B	Standard Error
UN voting record compared to China, "similar or dissimilar"	*0.833765	0.17698	*0.395474	0.15621
Land Border with China?	-0.14770	0.12308	0.04197	0.11305
Sea Border with China?	*-0.637385	0.18718	*-0.516610	0.18741
Polity IV Score	*0.023529	0.00596	-0.00244	0.00658
Total International Conflict of Bordering States	*0.099141	0.00903	*0.025633	0.01136
Total Civil Conflict of Bordering States	-0.01307	0.03018	*0.256065	0.02939
Military expenditure (% of GDP)	0.00120	0.01194	-0.01378	0.01631
Log of Armed Forces Personnel	*0.197335	0.04763	*0.095848	0.04626
Log of GDP Per Capita	0.08862	0.04968	*0.088117	0.04277
Trade (% of GDP)	0.00097	0.00088	-0.00125	0.00074
Log of Population	-0.01275	0.05170	*0.107212	0.05253
Log of Oil and Gas Value (2009 US$)	0.01744	0.02905	-0.02838	0.02530
Constant	*-3.571333	0.72953	*-3.410998	0.71964
R Square	.276		0.212	
Observations	812		1031	

Table 4

	Model 1	Model 2

Natural Resources and Chinese ODI Table 5

	Log of Oil and Gas Value (2009 US$)		Oil Rents (% of GDP)		Coal Rents (% of GDP)		Mineral Rents (% of GDP)	
	B	Standard Error	B	Standard Error	B	Standard Error	B	Standard Error
N voting cord mpared to iina, milar or ssimilar"	*-16.788071	8.016000	-21.769872	11.976475	*-24.718681	12.097941	-14.482000	7.873881
lity IV core	-0.078449	0.090000	0.047476	0.101353	-0.023000	0.105068	-0.101000	0.082878
tal ernational nflict of rdering ates	*0.289791	0.104000	0.237736	0.126449	*0.293203	0.124085	*0.312222	0.101685
tal Civil nflict of rdering ates	0.507321	0.432000	0.394231	0.443113	0.404000	0.450753	0.526000	0.426586
litary penditure of GDP)	0.105639	0.158000	-0.074715	0.176125	-0.077000	0.176821	0.129000	0.155790
g of Armed rces rsonnel	-0.817626	0.530000	0.021336	0.707184	-0.030000	0.787020	-0.963000	0.521104
g of GDP r Capita	-0.260202	0.522000	*-1.871866	0.687272	*-1.334480	0.758216	-0.049000	0.472392
ade (% of DP)	*0.035885	0.012000	0.002534	0.018334	0.025000	0.016191	*0.039808	0.011687
g of pulation	0.974561	0.615000	-0.376216	0.817735	-0.022000	0.828905	*1.308062	0.540516
tural esource riable	0.222681	0.339000	*0.074621	0.030106	-0.586000	0.582560	*0.201572	0.069656
nstant	21.750000	12.035969	*56.767239	17.151045	*12.036000	17.001443	13.404128	10.225958
Square	0.081		0.134		0.100		0.104	
servations	322		213		219		322	
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	

Bibliography

Aberg, John. "China's Revisionist Orientation." The Diplomat. September 18, 2014. Accessed September 22, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/chinas-revisionist-orientation/.

AidData. Accessed April 17, 2015. http://aiddata.org/donor-datasets.

Anton Strezhnev; Erik Voeten, 2013, "United Nations General Assembly Voting Data". http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/Voeten/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globalId=hdl:1902.1/12379.

Bromley, Mark. "The Hu Jintao Decade in China's Foreign and Security Policy (2002–12): Assessments and Implication." 2013.

Brown, Jonathan N., and Anthony S. Marcum. "Avoiding Audience Costs: Domestic Political Accountability and Concessions in Crisis Diplomacy." *Security Studies* 20, no. 2 (2011): 141-70.

Carlson, Allen. "Moving Beyond Sovereignty? A Brief Consideration of Recent Change in China's Approach to International Order and the Emergence of the Tianxia Concept." *Journal of Contemporary China* 20, no. 68 (2010): 89-102.

Center for Systemic Peace. "INSCR Data." 2014. Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2013. http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.

Chen, Dingding. "3 Reasons the BRICS' New Development Bank Matters." The Diplomat. July 23, 2014. Accessed November 14, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/3-reasons-the-brics-new-development-bank-matters/.

Cheung, Yin-Wong, and Xingwang Qian. "Empirics Of China'S Outward Direct Investment."*Pacific Economic Review*, 2009, 312-41.

"China Outward Direct Investment." February 1, 2013. Accessed April 17, 2015. http://www.tusiad.org/__rsc/shared/file/ChinaBusinessInsight-February-2013.pdf.

"China, Zambia Reaffirm to Seek Stronger Relationship." China National People's Congress. March 1, 2010. Accessed April 17, 2015. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/news/2010-03/01/content_1546149.htm.

Chiozza, Giacomo, and Hein E. Goemans. *Leaders and International Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011.

Dreher, Axel, and Andreas Fuchs. "Rogue Aid? The Determinants of China's Aid Allocation." 2012.

"EEZ Waters Of China." Sea Around Us Project. 2015. http://www.seaaroundus.org/eez/156.aspx.

Fearon, James. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." The American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (1994).

Hanauer, Larry, and Morris, Lyle J. *Chinese Engagement in Africa: Drivers, Reactions, and Implications for U.S. Policy*. 2014.

Howell, Kellan. "A 'new Cold War': China's Top Paper Warns of 'slippery Slope' towards Conflict with U.S." Washington Times. July 24, 2014. Accessed April 17, 2015. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/12/new-cold-war-chinas-top-paper-warns-slippery-slope/.

Jia, Ruixue, Masayuki Kudamatsu, and David Seim. "Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance in the Political Selection in China." 2013.

Johnston, Alastair I. *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008.

Lammers, Ellen. "How Will the Beijing Consensus Benefit Africa?" The Broker. March 22, 2007. Accessed April 17, 2015. http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/Articles/How-will-the-Beijing-Consensus-benefit-Africa.

Li, Xiaobang. *China at War: An Encyclopedia*. 2012.

Lu, Rachel. "China's New Class Hierarchy: A Guide." *Foreign Policy*, April 25, 2014. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/25/chinas-new-class-hierarchy-a-guide/.

Ma, Xiaohu, Thomas Man, and Jun Deng. "China: China Outbound Investment: Beginning Of The End Of The Approval System?" Morrison & Foerster LLP. February 28, 2014. Accessed April 17, 2015. http://www.mondaq.com/x/295974/international trade investment/China Outbound Investment Beginning of the End of the Approval System.

Mesquita, Bruce Bueno De, and Alastair Smith. "Leader Survival, Revolutions, and the Nature of Government Finance." American Journal of Political Science, 2008, 936-50.

Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003.

Meunier, Sophie. "Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in the West: Five Minutes with Sophie Meunier." Interview by Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. May 28, 2014.

Miller, Alice. "The New Party Politburo Leadership." *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 40 (2013).

Momani, Bessma. "China at the International Monetary Fund: Continued Engagement In Its Drive for Membership and Added Voice at the IMF Executive Board." Journal of Chinese Economics 1, no. 1 (2013): 125-50.

Nash, Paul. "China's "Going Out" Strategy." January 1, 2012. Accessed March 19, 2015.

Nathan, Andrew J., Chaohui Hong, and Steven Smith. *Dilemmas of Reform in Jiang Zemin's China*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999.

OECD. "List of OECD Member Countries - Ratification of the Convention on the OECD". (2015).

"Realism and Idealism: US Policy toward Saudi Arabia, from the Cold War to Today." no. Winter 2005-06 (2005).

Ross, Michael L, 2013, "Oil and Gas Data, 1932-2011". http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/mlross/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globalId=hdl:1902.1/20369&studyListingIndex=1_4133b90126019bfdb8f35a8649ca.

Sachikonye, Lloyd. *Zimbabwe's Lost Decade: Politics, Development & Society*. Harare, Zimbabwe: Weaver Press, 2011.

Scissors, Derek. "Chinese Global Investment Growth Pauses." *AEI Research*, 2014.

Shinn, David Hamilton, and Joshua Eisenman. *China and Africa: A Century of Engagement*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012.

SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. (2015). http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php.

Slantchev, B. L. 2004. How initiators end their war: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace. *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(4): 813–829.

Thondhlana, Barnabas. "Zimbabwe: Bear Versus Dragon." *The Zimbabwe Independent*, August 1, 2014. http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2014/08/01/zimbabwe-bear-versus-dragon/.

Tiezzi, Shannon. "China's National Security Commission Holds First Meeting." The Diplomat. April 16, 2014. Accessed April 17, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/chinas-national-security-commission-holds-first-meeting/.

"U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and Analysis." 2014. http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ch.

Wang, Gungwu. "Wang Gungwu 王赓武 on Tianxia 天下." *The China Story Journal*, 2013.

Weeks, Jessica L. P. *Dictators at War and Peace.* 2014.

Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

"World Development Indicators." World Development Indicators. 2015. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.

Wu, Chengqiu. "Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Responsibility: Changes in China's Response to International Humanitarian Crises." Journal of Chinese Political Science 15, no. 1 (2009): 71-97.

Zhang, Qingyang. "China for Win-Win Relations with Africa." Ministry of Foreign Affairs. February 6, 2015. Accessed April 17, 2015. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1238546.shtml.

Zhao, Suisheng. "Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The Strident Turn." Journal of Contemporary China 22, no. 82 (2013): 535-53.

Zhao, Suisheng. *China's Search for Energy Security: Domestic Sources and International Implications*. London: Routledge, 2013.